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Abstract 
 
The paper examines challenges in effectively implementing the lender-of-last-resort function in the EU 
single financial market. Briefly highlighted are features of the EU financial landscape that could increase 
EU systemic financial risk. Briefly described are the complexities of the EU’s financial-stability 
architecture for preventing and resolving financial problems, including lender-of-last-resort operations. 
The paper examines how the lender-of-last-resort function might materialize during a systemic financial 
disturbance affecting more than one EU Member State. The paper identifies challenges and possible 
ways of enhancing the effectiveness of the existing architecture. 
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I.  Introduction 
Financial crisis management in the single financial market of the European Union (EU) is a 
subject attracting increased attention. As one of the key objectives of the political, economic, 
monetary, and legal integration of the EU’s 25 Member States, the single financial market is 
becoming a reality with the progressive expansion of cross-border financial services and the 
increased integration of national financial systems. While EU market liquidity and efficiency 
are no doubt improving, financial disturbances are now more likely to affect more than one 
Member State. Moreover, while European national financial systems are becoming 
systemically integrated, the EU’s financial-stability architecture is still based primarily on the 
exercise of national responsibilities. The extent to which the EU architecture of purely 
national responsibilities and tasks is also capable of addressing cross-border (and perhaps 
pan-European) financial disturbances is often discussed and questioned, in part because it has 
not yet been tested. 
In this context, the particular question addressed in this paper is how might the lender-of-last-
resort function materialize during a systemic financial disturbance affecting more than one 
EU Member State. The paper is organized as follows. Section II sets out the key features of 
the European financial landscape that might have increased the likelihood that cross-border, 
if not systemic, financial disturbances would, if they occur, affect the EU. Section III very 
briefly describes the EU’s architecture for financial crisis management. Section IV runs 
through the fundamental issues that are likely to arise in implementing the lender-of-last-
resort function in the EU context. Section V discusses the main challenges. Section VI 
identifies ways forward for enhancing the effectiveness of the existing architecture.
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II.  Systemic risk in the single financial market 
The European financial landscape is in an increasing state of flux. The process of financial 
integration accelerated as a result of the efforts––particularly in the past 5 years––to remove 
barriers to cross-border business, of the resulting higher competition which is also leading to 
concentration, and the introduction of the euro in 1999. At the same time, integration is also 
leading to broader and deeper systemic inter-linkages across the EU, which increasingly 
represents in this respect the features of a single financial market. In particular, the following 
represent the transmission channels that may increase the scope for systemic risk in the EU. 
Integrated financial markets and market infrastructures  
Wholesale financial markets are closely and in some cases fully integrated in the EU. This 
applies in particular to euro-denominated unsecured money and government bond markets. 
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Bank financing remains predominant in financial intermediation. Cross-border activity takes 
place mainly in high-volume markets for commonly tradable financial assets, including 
money market instruments, corporate bonds, or in the areas of investment banking and 
provision of financial services. Direct cross-border provision of financial services remains 
very limited in the retail sector; notably, traditional lending/deposit activities are v ery rarely 
conducted across borders. Market infrastructures are also becoming increasingly integrated. 
The TARGET payments system, operated by the Eurosystem, represents around 90 percent 
of large-value payments in euros. In securities and derivatives trading, regional and EU-wide 
mergers and alliances, such as Euronext, are moving towards reducing the existing 
fragmentation. In post-trading activities, there are now established pan-European providers of 
clearing and settlement services, such as Euroclear and Clearstream.  
Banking concentration at the domestic level 
Mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector in the past decade, mostly domestic, reduced 
the number of credit institutions in the EU and led to high concentration ratios in many 
Member States, particularly the small and medium-sized ones. For instance, in Belgium, 
Finland, and the Netherlands, the concentration ratio of the five largest banks exceeded 
80 percent (ECB 2004). More generally, the stability of the financial system in most Member 
States is increasingly dependent on a small number of systemically-important institutions 
whose size may range from half of GDP (France/Germany) to one-and-a-half of GDP 
(Belgium/Netherlands) (Praet 2005). Cross-border mergers and acquisitions are less 
significant, but are increasing since 1999 vis-à-vis a slowdown in domestic operations. 
Financial integration, competition, and limits to domestic concentration, as well as the 
introduction of the euro are the possible explanations (ECB 2005). 
The emergence of pan-European banking groups with complex structures  
Pan-European banking groups are emerging through cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
and the increasing provision of wholesale services in other Member States. Although the 
direct provision of services across Member States is the most cost-efficient mode of market 
entry, the EU’s single passport for banking services has been infrequently utilized. The 
indirect provision of services through the establishment of subsidiaries has been the preferred 
mode for several reasons, ranging from the need to adapt business activities to specific 
national features, taxation, insulation of liability, or legal and supervisory constraints 
(Dermine 2003). The main implication is that the major banking groups have complex 
financial and institutional structures. There are around 40 major banking groups which, on 
average, are present in probably more than six of the 25 Member States, with some having 
establishments almost across the whole EU (Padoa-Schioppa 2004). The expansion of 
complex banking structures presents a number of inconveniences, particularly in terms of 
structural, capital, and compliance costs.  
Centralization of business functions in banking groups  
Financial integration is also providing incentives for banking groups to re-organise and 
centralize certain key business functions at the group and EU levels. This allows banking 
groups to enhance operational efficiency and rationalize costs with regard to, for instance,   - 4 -   
back-office and strategic activities relating to financial markets. Liquidity and risk 
management are areas that are becoming increasingly centralized. One of the possibilities for 
re-organization is the merging of banks within a group into a single legal entity, which can 
then conduct cross-border business through the direct provision of services. As an example, 
the Nordea group has recently announced the adoption of the European Company Statute, 
which facilitates the merger of foreign entities into one. The re-organization of banking 
groups from complex structures into more simplified ones has a number of advantages linked 
to the unification of management and other internal systems, regulatory simplification, 
capital savings, and integrated risk management. At the same time, this will change the 
distribution of responsibilities between national authorities: while before all supervisors that 
licensed banks within a group were involved in its supervision, a unified group will be under 
the full jurisdiction and responsibility of a single national supervisor.  
The emergence of large and complex financial institutions  
Cross-sector financial activities are also intensifying in the single financial market. Major 
financial groups are engaging in a broad spectrum of financial services. These financial 
conglomerates, while for the most part combining banking and insurance services, are also 
involved in investment services and asset management. They are increasingly systemically 
significant within Europe. As a weighted average, financial conglomerates account for 
approximately 30 percent of the deposits and 20 percent of premium income in 15 EU 
Member States. In relation to assets, financial conglomerates have a considerably higher 
market share (European Commission 2004).  
Increased foreign ownership of financial assets 
The accession in May 2004 of the ten new Member States in the EU accentuated another 
potential transmission channel: systemic linkages between countries through cross-border 
ownership of financial assets. While certain regions, such as the Benelux and the Nordic 
countries, already presented a high degree of interdependence, the enlargement to the new 
Member States gave rise to considerably higher levels of linkages between banking systems. 
This is due to the strong presence of EU-based foreign ownership of the capital and assets of 
the banking systems of the new Member States, in many cases in excess of 70 percent and, in 
the case of Slovakia and Estonia, around 90 percent of banks’ share capital (European 
Commission 2004). This compares with the previous EU average of 30 percent foreign 
ownership of banking assets/capital.  
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Table 1 summarizes the key transmission channels that could increase the potential that a 
shock affecting a financial market or banking group would be transmitted and amplified 
across the EU.  
Table 1. Major Transmission Channels in the Single Financial Market 
Integrated money markets and other financial markets  
Integrated financial market infrastructures:  
•  Payment systems 
•  Securities clearing and settlement systems and other market infrastructures (trading systems, OTC markets)  
Major banks in concentrated domestic markets 
Emergence of pan-European banking groups with systemic relevance in several Member States (contagion through 
intragroup linkages and exposures among network of counterparties) 
Centralization of business functions in banking groups 
Emergence of large and complex financial institutions with systemic relevance in several Member States 
Increased foreign ownership of financial institutions and assets (as intensified by the recent EU enlargement)  
 
 
III.  The architecture for financial crisis management 
The EU’s institutional architecture for financial crisis management reflects three principles: 
decentralization, segmentation, and cooperation (see Table 2).
3 
First, it is based on decentralization, since the performance of financial stability functions 
relevant for crisis management is based in large part on the exercise of national 
responsibilities by banking supervisors, central banks, treasuries and deposit insurance 
schemes. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks of the 
Eurosystem
4 have financial-stability-related responsibilities, notably in the field of oversight 
of payment systems and contribution to national policies on financial stability and 
supervision. The performance of the lender-of-last-resort function is likewise a national 
responsibility. This is also the case in the euro area, where the provision of emergency 
liquidity assistance (ELA) is under the responsibility and liability of national central banks. It 
is a unique circumstance in which a central bank may be providing ELA but has no 
monetary-policy (as opposed to monetary-operations) responsibilities. There are 
arrangements for an adequate flow of information within the Eurosystem in order that the 
                                                     
3 Lastra (2003) uses this triad to describe financial supervision in the EU.  
4 The Eurosystem comprises the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs) of those 
countries that have adopted the euro. This contrasts with the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
comprised of the ECB and the NCBs of all EU Member States whether they have adopted the euro or not.    - 6 -   
potential liquidity impact of ELA operations can be managed in the context of the single 
monetary policy (ECB 2000).  
Table 2. The Institutional Architecture of the Single Financial Market 
Levels  FUNCTIONS  DECISION-MAKERS  COOPERATION 
STRUCTURES 
EU 
(25 
Member 
States) 
•  EU legislation (minimum 
harmonization) 
•  Policy-coordination 
•  Policy-shaping 
•  State aid control 
•  ECOFIN Council 
•  European Parliament 
•  European Commission: 
i) legislative proposals/ 
ii) competition authority 
•  Economic and Financial 
Committee  
•  Financial Services 
Committee  
•  Regulatory committees 
EMU 
(12 
Member 
States) 
•  Single monetary policy 
•  Payment systems’ 
oversight  
•  Contribution to financial 
stability and supervision 
 
•  ECB’s Governing 
Council 
 
 
•  Eurosystem committees 
•  National legislation 
•  Use of public funds 
•  25 finance ministries 
•  25 national parliaments 
•  At the EU level 
 
•  Banking supervision 
•  Insurance supervision 
•  Securities regulation 
•  Supervision of financial 
conglomerates 
 
•  13 national central banks 
•  13 single (cross-sectoral) 
supervisory agencies 
•  1 banking supervisor 
•  ca. 12 insurance and 
pensions supervisors 
•  ca. 12 securities 
regulators 
•  Home- /host-country 
relationships 
•  Consolidated supervision 
of banking groups 
•  Supplementary 
supervision of financial 
conglomerates 
•  Supervisory committees 
•  Bilateral, banking groups’, 
regional and EU-wide 
MoU 
•  Central banking functions 
(Member States outside 
euro area) 
•  Lender of last resort 
(emergency liquidity 
assistance) 
 
•  25 national central banks 
•  ECB’s Governing Council 
(euro area) and General 
Council (EU) 
•  Eurosystem committees 
(euro area or EU) 
•  EU-wide and regional 
MoU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National 
•  Deposit insurance  •  Ca. 35 schemes (with 
diverse features) 
•  Informal 
Legal framework: EU Treaty + directly applicable national laws and regulations (minimum 
harmonization through EU legislation) enforced by national authorities and courts 
 
Second, the financial stability functions are segmented across sectors and Member States. 
Banking supervision is exercised by single (cross-sectoral) supervisory authorities and 
national central banks and, in some cases, is shared between the central bank and the   - 7 -   
supervisor.
5 The prudential framework followed by supervisors is largely harmonized by EU 
legislation, however, although its practical application may vary given the decentralized 
setting. Supervision of banking groups and financial conglomerates is conducted separately 
by each of the supervisors that licensed each entity of the group. Coordination between 
supervisors is achieved by “consolidating” and “coordinator” supervisors, which have limited 
powers to override decisions by individual authorities. In the single monetary jurisdiction of 
the euro governed by the ECB, banking supervision and ELA are under the responsibility and 
liability of the national authorities. Lastly, although some elements of deposit guarantee 
schemes are harmonized at the EU level, they have broadly developed in different ways in 
each Member State.  
Third, a number of cooperation structures are in place for bridging the potential gaps of 
coverage between national responsibilities and the several functions. These structures range 
from legal provisions (e.g., consolidated supervision) to committees and memoranda of 
understanding.  
Cooperation between functions through committee-structures  
Given the decentralization and segmentation of financial stability functions, a number of 
committees organize cooperation at the EU level between authorities (see Table 3). These 
include supervisory, treasury, and central banking functions. In the supervisory field, there 
are sectoral committees in the areas of banking, securities, and insurance. The role of these 
committees is to provide technical advice to the European Commission on regulation and 
pursue the convergence of supervisory practices. Cooperation between treasuries takes place 
at the highest level through the Council of the EU, consisting of the Economics and Finance 
Ministers (Ecofin Council), which decides the EU policy on financial markets. The 
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC)––comprising finance ministries and central 
banks––provides advice to the Ecofin, also on financial stability issues, including crisis 
management.
6 In central banking, the existing committees are established under the 
Eurosystem/ESCB to advise the decision-making bodies of the ECB. 
                                                     
5 National central banks perform supervisory functions in 13 of the 25 Member States: Austria (in part), Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Germany (in part), Greece, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Spain. 
6 Economic Paper No. 156, European Commission, July 2001, (available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers156_en.htm).   - 8 -   
Table 3. The Committee-Structures of the Single Financial Market 
Decision-making  ECOFIN Council  European Parliament  ECB’s Governing Council 
(euro area of 12 Member States) 
Finance Ministries 
(policy-making) 
ECOFIN Council 
(Informal Eurogroup) 
 
Economic and Financial 
Committee  Financial Services Committee 
Commission and 
Finance Ministries 
(regulatory) 
European 
Banking 
Committee  
European Insurance 
and Occupational 
Pensions Committee 
European Securities 
Committee  
Financial 
Conglomerates 
Committee 
Supervisors 
(operational) 
Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors 
(London) 
Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational 
Pension Supervisors 
(Frankfurt) 
Committee of European 
Securities Regulators 
(Paris) 
Central banks 
(operational) 
Committees of the Eurosystem/ESCB––in euro area or EU-wide compositions (market 
operations, payment and settlement systems, banking supervision and financial stability) 
 
Cooperation agreements at the EU level 
The architecture also comprises EU-wide cooperation agreements between authorities––
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU)––in crisis situations. The general aim of the MoU is to 
set out basic principles and procedures for disseminating information once disturbances are 
apparent and support the performance of financial stability tasks in the single financial 
market. This, however, is without prejudice to the discretionary exercise of responsibilities 
by national authorities, particularly since the MoU are non-legally binding and have thus a 
voluntary nature.  
There are two MoUs currently in place on financial crisis management.
7 The first MoU was 
adopted in 2003 between EU banking supervisors and central banks under the aegis of the 
Banking Supervision Committee of the Eurosystem/ESCB. It should apply in crises with a 
possible cross-border impact involving individual banks or banking groups, or relating to 
disturbances in money and financial markets and/or market infrastructures with potential 
common implications for Member States. The MoU is designed to facilitate the interaction 
between central banking and supervisory functions in terms of assessing the systemic scope 
of a crisis and taking actions. Its provisions include principles and procedures on identifying 
the authorities responsible and on the cross-border flow of information.
8 The second MoU 
was adopted in May 2005 between the EU banking supervisors, central banks, and finance 
ministries.
9 The explicit objective is to preserve the stability of the financial systems of both 
                                                     
7 In addition to these MoU, the EU banking supervisors and central banks also adopted in 2001 the MoU on 
cooperation between payment systems overseers and banking supervisors in stage three of economic and 
monetary union, which sets out arrangements for co-operation and information in relation to large-value 
payment systems. Press release available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2001/html/pr010402.en.html. 
8 Press release available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2003/html/pr030310_3.en.html. 
9 Press release available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2005/html/pr050518_1.en.html.    - 9 -   
individual Member States and of the EU as a whole, thus acknowledging the need to consider 
how to balance the different dimensions of systemic risk. The MoU aims in particular at 
providing initial conditions for policy coordination between all these authorities in the case 
of systemic crisis with spillovers in several countries.  
Conclusion 
The potential effectiveness of the lender of last resort function in the single financial market 
needs to be assessed in the context of the other components of the EU and national 
architecture for crisis management. In other words, the provision or not of ELA, and the 
conditions under which it will be considered, might be determined to a large extent by the 
outcomes of the domestic, cross-border, and cross-functional interplay between the different 
authorities involved.  
 
IV.  The Lender of Last Resort Function in Practice  
What would happen if a pan-European banking group––with banks licensed and operating in 
several Member States––would suddenly experience a liquidity shock? Banking groups play 
an important role in European money markets, often acting as providers of liquidity in the 
interbank markets––acting thus as “money-centers”––to smaller banks (Cabral et al 2002). 
They are also counterparts to other large European and global financial institutions spanning 
a large set of markets. And they are key participants in the main payment systems as well as 
clearing and settlement systems. Therefore, a shock affecting such banking groups could 
potentially lead to systemic implications in both national markets and the European financial 
system as whole, notably in terms of impact on the liquidity distribution channels. 
Detection of a liquidity shock 
Central banks would likely be the first authorities to detect disturbances at the level of 
liquidity in money markets, payment systems, and common market infrastructures. 
Disturbances would be first detected at the national level, also in the euro area given the 
decentralized setting for the conduct of operational tasks by the central banks of the 
Eurosystem. Central banks could detect warning signs such as intra-day or overnight 
liquidity shortages in individual banks; delays or failures to settle interbank transactions or 
collateral in monetary policy operations; settlement delays; or the failure of a central 
counterparty, clearing house, or securities-settlement systems to process securities transfers, 
which could spillover to payment systems.  
Given the systemic inter-linkages described above, the local knowledge gathered by central 
banks would need to be considered at the EU level. In the case of the euro area, the existing 
infrastructure of the ECB/Eurosystem would certainly play a major role. In particular, the 
Eurosystem committees would have an operational role in collecting local information and 
thus in detecting and assessing the extent of the disturbances for the euro money markets and 
market infrastructures. In the case of the central banks outside the euro area, more bilateral or 
regional cooperation could be expected, although the Eurosystem/ESCB committees could 
also be involved.   - 10 -   
Assessment of systemic risk 
Central banks are also the authorities in an advantageous (and perhaps the best) position to 
assess the potential implications for systemic stability. They have a clear mandate for 
preserving financial stability and have the competences required to assess the possible 
systemic implications of a financial problem or crisis both on the real economy and in terms 
of spillovers to other financial institutions and/or markets.  
Understanding the potential systemic extent of disturbances affecting a banking group 
present in more than one Member State would involve a complex mapping of the relevant 
transmission channels. This may include intra-group (across jurisdictions) and inter-group 
relations (interbank/intercountry), market exposures, infrastructures, and any combination of 
these. In addition, central banks would have recourse to sources of information beyond their 
tasks, notably supervisors, foreign central banks, or market participants. Depending on the 
magnitude of the shock, this exercise could be quite challenging to coordinate.  
Furthermore, the potential for systemic risk can be considered in different dimensions. It may 
be considered in terms of the impact on other banks, markets, and infrastructures wherever 
they are located in Europe or globally; or it may be considered in terms of the components of 
the national financial system. The national scope of systemic risk would likely diverge across 
countries, given, for instance, the importance of the banking group’s activities in each 
national market, its counterparty relationships, or participation in payment or settlement 
systems. Some central banks could therefore have different perceptions on systemic risk, 
which may have a bearing on the process leading to the provision of ELA (if systemic risk is 
indeed a criterion for providing it). 
Jurisdiction of the lender of last resort  
With regard to the banking group affected directly by the liquidity shock, if it is not able to 
obtain collateralized funding from the markets––in spite of the central banks’ supply of 
aggregate liquidity––it could warrant or expressly request ELA from a central bank.  
The preliminary issue is jurisdiction. Which national central bank would be the lender of last 
resort vis-à-vis a banking group, and on what terms? There are two alternatives. The first is 
that the lender of last resort operates with regard to the group as a whole, thus meeting its 
total liquidity needs. Considering factors such as national brands, consolidated supervision, 
or the trend of centralisation of liquidity management, the banking group could request ELA 
from the central bank of the jurisdiction of the parent or main bank. The liquidity provided 
could then be channelled intragroup to the banks in other countries. The other alternative is 
that each of the banks of the group requests separate ELA from the national central bank of 
the jurisdiction where they are licensed, on the basis of each bank’s specific liquidity needs 
and assets.  
These jurisdictional possibilities would represent different criteria for providing emergency-
liquidity assistance and different forms of credit risk-sharing among central banks. 
Centralized ELA without limiting the supply of liquidity to its jurisdiction would mean that 
one national central bank would bear the full credit risk with regard to a banking group that   - 11 -   
could be present in more than 6 and up to 19 countries (Schoenmaker and Osterloo, 2005). 
The backing of cross-border externalities by a national central bank would correspond to a 
sort of exercise of “federal” responsibilities. In the decentralized option, differences in 
criteria for providing ELA could entail a misalignment of objectives in providing ELA that 
would need to be considered and coordinated. There would be some degree of risk-sharing 
among the central banks, which would be not straightforward in case the group has 
centralized liquidity management: liquidity needs would relate to the group as a whole and 
not to individual banks, and collateral could be also centralized and may not be easily 
transferable. 
Assessing the solvency position of a pan-European banking group 
A national central bank considering ELA would also need to assess the solvency position of 
the banking group and/or of the individual banks of the group. While central banks have 
direct access to information from their operational tasks, they would need to enhance their 
understanding of the banking group’s problem, notably by requesting information from the 
group itself and more crucially from supervisors. How this would be organized in practice 
would probably very much depend on the specific features of the situation. Obtaining a 
comprehensive set of information on a pan-European banking group would, however, require 
good coordination between the central banks and supervisors.  
On the central banking side, the trend towards centralization of liquidity and risk 
management by banking groups suggests that the central bank of the jurisdiction where such 
centralization takes place would have an informational and logistical advantage. On the 
supervisory side, as analyzed above, there are EU coordination rules that provide that 
relevant information should be gathered by the consolidating supervisor, normally at the 
level of the parent bank. In turn, this supervisor has the duty to disseminate such information 
in emergency situations to all the supervisors and the central banks concerned. Cooperation 
structures, such as committees or MoUs may facilitate the interaction between authorities, 
but they may also add a layer of complexity. 
National central banks would therefore rely to a large extent on banking supervisory 
information and related assessments on the financial condition of the banks. This might be a 
challenge because the pursuit of the respective mandates of central banks and supervisors 
might not be perfectly aligned, given the different nature of such mandates. In particular, 
central banks will be concerned about assessing rapidly the degree of credit risk that might be 
involved in providing liquidity to individual banks. Supervisors, on the other hand, might 
have constraints in terms of the supervisory process and timing in providing their assessment 
to central banks.  
Interaction with treasuries 
Credit to individual banks can only, in principle, be provided against adequate collateral and 
at market rates or higher penalty rates. A credit operation below market rates would represent 
an injection of public funds, which is not a function of central banks but rather of the state. 
Moreover, the EU Treaty provides that state aid may only be provided if it complies with 
certain conditions and after a process of approval by the European Commission; in addition,   - 12 -   
the Treaty’s prohibition of monetary financing also prevents central banks from incurring 
financial costs to be borne by the state.  
As a lender of last resort, central banks may incur greater credit risk––on an exceptional basis 
in order to ease liquidity constraints––by accepting collateral below the standards required 
for monetary policy operations. The exact degree of credit risk incurred may be difficult to 
assess in practice given the nature of banks’ assets (e.g., loans which may not be disposed of 
swiftly enough without loosing value). If the ELA operation results in losses, national 
budgets will bear such losses either by the need to compensate central banks or via the lower 
return on dividends.  
Therefore, the provision of ELA in situations of significant credit risk may warrant some 
degree of interaction with treasuries, given that public funds might ultimately be put at risk. 
For instance, in the UK it is explicitly stated that the Chancellor would be given the option of 
refusing a financial-support operation proposed by the Bank of England or the Financial 
Services Authority.
10 In other countries with less explicit terms, this understanding is 
probably implicit. This interaction could potentially lead to national biases in assessing the 
degree of the threat to the financial system, given that national budgets will ultimately cover 
losses. In a cross-border systemic crisis, cooperation between treasuries––along the lines of 
the 2005 MoU––may thus be warranted to dispel such a bias.  
Conclusion: pressure points of the lender of last resort 
Several pressure-points (summarized in Table 4) can be identified in the performance of the 
lender of last resort function. The common denominator to these pressure points is that in 
stress situations the potential cross-border externalities will need to be adequately considered 
by all the authorities involved, in particular with regard to major players, such as pan-EU 
banking groups. 
                                                     
10 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial 
Services Authority, 1997, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk.   - 13 -   
Table 4. Pressure Points of the Lender of Last Resort Function 
Detection of disturbances at the European level (sharing of local knowledge)  
Jurisdiction of the lender of last resort for banking groups:  
•  Centralization vs. decentralization 
•  Misalignment of objectives of and criteria for providing emergency-liquidity assistance 
•  Terms of providing assistance 
Assessment of systemic risk at the European level:  
•  Complexity in mapping propagation channels  
•  Multiplicity of sources of information 
•  Uneven systemic implications across countries 
Assessment of the solvency position of pan-European banking groups: 
•  Coordination in gathering information (from the banking group, market participants, supervisors) 
•  Access and reliance on supervisory information 
Interaction between central banking and supervisory functions––mandates may not be perfectly aligned 
Interaction with treasuries 
 
V.  Challenges  
Given that the expansion of cross-border banking activities is also observed in other regions 
and globally, what is distinct about the challenges to the EU’s financial stability architecture? 
The answer is that the single financial market is a declared objective of the EU. A framework 
comprising rules, tools, and incentives (such as the single passport) is specifically set up for 
cross-border financial services. The pursuit of financial stability should be one of its basic 
components. In addition, there are supranational mechanisms available for dealing with 
coordination problems between authorities. Such mechanisms include EU legislation and, at 
the limit, may involve the performance of financial stability functions at the EU level. 
This section identifies the challenges that may arise in implementing the EU lender of last 
resort function and also for the EU’s financial stability architecture more generally. A final 
section concludes with a brief discussion of the possibilities for enhancing the effectiveness 
of the existing architecture. 
Institutional coordination issues 
Safeguarding financial stability generally, and an effective lender of last resort more 
specifically, require the assessment and containment of financial problems before they 
become systemic and have the potential to adversely affect the real economy.
11 Within the 
current EU architecture, this necessarily must be seen as a joint objective of the authorities 
responsible for financial stability, including central banks, supervisors, and treasuries to 
varying degrees. As elsewhere, within Europe a number of pre-conditions seem necessary to 
support this objective: (i) a clear assignment of responsibilities to the various authorities 
                                                     
11 See Schinasi (2005), in particular Chapter VI.   - 14 -   
within the architecture; (ii) the effective collection, dissemination, and sharing of information 
in crisis situations; and (iii) the coordination of decisions by different authorities to the extent 
necessary and possible, so that the pursuit of their respective mandates can be aligned for 
safeguarding stability across the single financial market. 
The credibility of the public-policy architecture for assessing and containing systemic risk 
relates to its effectiveness in a real crisis. The pre-conditions mentioned above may be 
decisive, for instance, in terms of supporting private sector solutions, preventing the 
breakdown of liquidity distribution channels, avoiding bank-runs, or facilitating the orderly 
winding down of institutions in difficulties. Moreover, transparency of the architecture is also 
linked to its credibility. Constructive ambiguity regarding the predisposition of authorities to 
intervene is not ambiguity about the allocation of responsibilities or the mechanisms in place 
for crisis situations; instead, it relates to the conditions in which public support may be given 
to institutions in difficulties. 
Against this background, the pressure points identified above for the lender of last resort 
suggest three main challenges for institutional coordination among authorities.  
First, the lender of last resort is a function performed at the national level by central banks. 
This means that central banks’ decisions will be guided by their national mandates 
(circumscribed to their jurisdiction) and institutional frameworks. In the case of the potential 
provision of ELA to a pan-European banking group, they may have to deal with significant 
cross-border externalities. In particular, the decision of one central bank to perform or not the 
function of the lender of last resort will necessarily affect the other central banks’ 
jurisdictions. Coordination between the central banks involved may not be straightforward, 
however. More precisely, the assessments of the credit risk and systemic risk involved in the 
ELA may differ among central banks from their respective national perspectives. For 
instance, the systemic risk of the banking group in a certain Member State may not be 
deemed important, although it might be systemically relevant in the other countries involved. 
The potential contagion to national systems may be uneven, or there might be different 
macroeconomic considerations in each system. The credit risk may be considered too high. 
Or a central bank may not deem itself lender of last resort to the group. This balancing act of 
central banks as potential lenders of last resort will involve careful assessments of their 
responsibilities for cross-border externalities, which may require close coordination between 
them.  
Second, the responsible authorities––banking supervisors, central banks, and treasuries, 
separately or collectively––would need to effectively process the available information into a 
cohesive assessment of the systemic ramifications of a crisis situation throughout the EU. 
The distribution of responsibilities is based on the home-country principle for supervisors, 
while central banks perform their tasks in their respective jurisdictions. In the case of a 
banking group, the consolidating supervisor is expected to gather and disseminate micro-
prudential information, while macro-prudential information will be gathered by the central 
banks with jurisdiction over the markets and infrastructures in which the banking group is a 
key player. The mismatch between home-country control of supervision and host-country 
(central bank) operational conduct of financial market surveillance, may potentially give rise 
to a gap between micro- and macro-prudential controls. Overcoming this mismatch would be   - 15 -   
essential for effectively dealing with a crisis since home- and host-country cooperation would 
be required for mapping and understanding the relevant transmission channels. In addition, 
treasuries would also need to obtain both national and EU-wide assessments of the systemic 
scope of a crisis situation. The existing MoUs are designed to facilitate the assessment of 
systemic risk for the EU as a whole, which could also be supported by the EU committees 
and the Eurosystem/ESCB arrangements. A formal mechanism at the EU level for assessing 
systemic risk as such is however not yet in place. 
Third, it follows that the actual decisions of central banks and supervisors (and eventually 
treasuries) involved vis-à-vis a European banking group or its components may need to be 
coordinated at the cross-border level in order to be aligned towards common objectives (or at 
least for facilitating instead of cancelling each other’s out). In particular, the macroprudential 
responsibilities of central banks may need to be coordinated with the microprudential 
responsibilities of supervisors. This may prove a challenge to the extent that responsibility 
for a bank or a particular market at the national level may not translate well to cross-border 
spillovers. The more diffuse the responsibility (with a number of different authorities in 
several countries) the harder it could be to achieve cross-border coordination of decisions.  
Coordination models 
Given the coordination issues identified above, there are alternative models of coordination 
for the performance of the lender-of-last-resort function vis-à-vis a banking group.  
The first relies on detailed ex ante arrangements and may be designated as the “Nordic 
model.” It is set out in the MoU between the Nordic central banks
12 which will apply in the 
event of a crisis of a bank with operations in two or more Nordic countries.
13 It consists of 
the establishment, once a crisis is detected, of a coordination structure––a “crisis 
management group”––among the central banks involved. Under the leadership of the central 
bank where the management of the banking group is domiciled, this crisis management group 
centralizes the gathering and analysis of information regarding the financial condition of the 
banking group and the potential systemic implications. In addition, it centralizes the contacts 
with the banking group’s management. It will also be responsible for briefing the decision-
making bodies of each central bank. The briefing will include information on the systemic 
relevance of the crisis, the solvency position of the bank(s) affected, and, most importantly, 
clarify any differences of opinion between the central banks. The aim is that each central 
bank takes informed and possibly coordinated decisions. The main advantage of this model is 
that it attempts to minimize informational and analytical asymmetries among central banks 
and thus mitigate prisoners’ dilemma type situations. On the other hand, the extent to which 
                                                     
12 MoU available at http://www.riksbank.com/upload/Dokument_riksbank/Kat_AFS/samradsdok_kris_eng.pdf. 
13 The main example is Nordea, as the largest Nordic banking group with approximately EUR 250 billion in 
assets. Its market shares in domestic markets range between 15 percent and 40 percent. The holding company, 
established in Sweden, owns Nordea Bank in Finland, as well as Nordea’s securities, asset management and 
insurance arms established in Sweden and Denmark. In turn, the Nordea Bank (Finland) owns banks in Sweden, 
Denmark, and Norway. Very recently, Nordea decided to move into a single company with a cross-border 
branching structure.   - 16 -   
an effective coordination structure could be set-up for all EU banking groups can be 
questioned, if not disputed. The Nordic context is characterized by strong systemic (but also 
cultural and linguistic) inter-linkages. This is not applicable to other regional markets or the 
EU as a whole, where the systemic impact would probably differ considerably among 
countries.  
The second model of coordination may be designated as the “supervisory model”. Because 
the EU implementation of Basel II will lead to a reinforcement of the coordination tasks of 
the consolidating supervisor (vis-à-vis the other supervisors of the group), it can be argued 
that the national central bank of the jurisdiction of the consolidating supervisor could also 
assume coordinating tasks vis-à-vis the other central banks concerned. A supporting 
argument is that this model would be consistent not only with the supervisory framework but 
also with the centralization of liquidity management in banking groups. However, this would 
imply that one central bank would take a higher degree of responsibility for the banking 
group with regard to the other central banks. It would, for instance, have to consider with 
greater intensity the group- and EU-wide––vis-à-vis the domestic––perspective in terms of 
solvency and systemic risk. It would attribute to the national central bank to some extent––as 
it does to the consolidating supervisor––limited EU “federal” tasks with regard to the 
banking groups under its jurisdiction.  
Lastly, there is the possibility of no ex ante coordination arrangements in terms of risk 
sharing, but the commitment of the central banks involved to exchange information and 
coordinate their policy measures on the basis of the existing cooperation structures, as 
described above. 
 
VI.  Ways Forward: Coordination vs. Centralization of Policy-Making 
One of the conclusions of this paper is that the lender-of-last-resort function in Europe cannot 
be disentangled from the overall architecture for financial stability. The efficient operation of 
the lender of last resort in a systemic crisis will crucially depend on the effectiveness of the 
other financial stability functions, notably supervision and potentially the treasuries. In an 
optimal setting, the authorities’ mandates should be aligned in the pursuit of the stability of 
the single financial market. Thus, short of reforming the existing architecture, the overall 
challenge is its effective implementation. Two options are apparent for optimizing the current 
framework.  
First, coordination between authorities––central banks, supervisors, and treasuries––could be 
ensured. The expansion of cross-border business increases the likelihood of conflicts of 
interest between the pursuit of national mandates and the need to consider the wider cross-
border systemic implications in decision-making. It might be illusory to believe that conflicts 
of interest may be resolved ex ante or optimally during a crisis in view of the present 
architecture. Even if the authorities had the benefit of complete and perfect information, 
reliance on the pursuit of national mandates may still leave gaps in the consideration of the 
systemic impact of a crisis. A possible means to help manage conflicts is to make clear the 
possible cross-border systemic implications of the crisis to all authorities involved. This may   - 17 -   
help avoid the most serious and costly outcomes. Mechanisms may include––following the 
“Nordic” model––pooling of information on systemic risk, joint assessments of systemic 
implications associated with the failure of a large institution, procedures for consideration of 
EU-wide systemic threats, and regular stress-testing and simulation exercises. The 
implementation of Basel II is also an opportunity to enhance coordination, because a 
consolidating supervisor will be nominated for each banking group, and the supervisors 
involved will adopt written coordination agreements.  
More generally, as markets become more integrated and pan-European, the nature of 
systemic risk will continue to change, because markets can act as both vehicles of contagion 
as well as stabilizing forces. In the case of the near collapse of Long Term Capital 
Management, there was a simultaneous crisis of markets and institutions very much driven 
by the strong inter-linkages between participants in derivatives and other markets. Greater 
coordination at the EU level could also aim at providing an effective multilateral surveillance 
mechanism over pan-European markets as well as the institutions within them. Given their 
vital role in ensuring both financial and monetary stability, central banks have a natural, if 
not central role to play in this effort. This applies in particular to the ECB and the national 
central banks of the Eurosystem, which comprise a supranational network that is well placed 
to assess the systemic nature of a liquidity shock and generalized financial market 
disturbances.  
All in all, a coordination model should make the most of the advantages of a decentralized 
approach to preserving financial stability, in particular the local knowledge on the features of 
the components of the financial system. Therefore, the wealth of knowledge associated with 
the EU decentralized approach can be seen as particularly valuable, provided that effective 
coordination procedures and mechanisms are in place to tackle the systemic implications of a 
crisis. Accordingly, banking supervisors, central banks, and finance ministries are working 
towards enhancing substantially their coordination arrangements, which include the 2005 
MoU, a crisis simulation exercise to test the MoU and to assess how cooperation might work 
in practice,
14 and agreements on best practices in crisis management. 
The second option for enhancement is the centralization, or rather the federalization, of 
financial stability functions. This option might emerge if coordination issues are not 
adequately resolved. As noted before, given the decentralized banking supervision and 
financial market surveillance, it may prove difficult to work out responsibilities on an ad-hoc 
basis in the midst of a crisis. This may be particularly valid in view of the potentially 
increasing number of European banking groups. In terms of business functions, banking 
groups are increasingly integrated––notably in terms of liquidity management––and also may 
establish themselves under a single legal entity. The question is whether financial stability 
functions should mirror such an environment and thus be federalized. This could happen 
either at the national level, with the extension of the home-country control to all the 
                                                     
14 See Financial Times news article, “EU agrees financial crisis plan,” May 16, 2005, p.15: “The memorandum 
of understanding, agreed by the 25 EU members, will be tested next year with a full-scale simulation of a 
financial crisis. The most likely scenario to be tested would involve a collapse  by a big bank operating across 
EU borders.”   - 18 -   
components of a banking group, or at the EU level, with a transfer of competence to 
supranational authority(ies). The analysis in this paper suggests that such an institutional 
move, if ever required by potential coordination issues, would need to involve all financial 
stability functions. That is, if the option for “federalization” of the lender-of-last-resort 
function––at the national or EU level––would be elected, it should involve similar 
arrangements for supervision of banking groups, which, in turn, could involve some degree 
of mutualization among Member States of the contingency public funds to be potentially 
employed in a systemic crisis.   - 19 -   
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